



Divergences continue over Global Stocktake negotiations

Nov. 13, Belém (Radhika Chatterjee) - Negotiations on matters related to the Global Stocktake (GST) have revealed the continuation of key divergences amongst Parties at the on-going climate talks in Belém, Brazil.

With the swift adoption of the agenda on the first day of the 7th session of the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement [CMA7], work on all matters relating to the GST began in full swing from Nov 11 onwards, under the work of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies [SBs].

Discussions have been particularly contentious on matters relating to the scope, purpose and objective of the 'UAE dialogue' [under para 97 of the GST decision from Dubai]. These are a continuation of the divergences that came to the fore at the June session of the SBs [SB62] during consideration of this matter.

Discussions on the 'Refinement of the overall GST process' [in preparation for the next GST] revealed key divergences around the issue of aligning the 7th Assessment Report [AR7] cycle of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] to that of the second GST (GST 2) process.

In the discussions on the 'Annual GST dialogue' [under para 187 of the GST decision from Dubai],

the main point of divergence amongst Parties hinged on the issue of what kind of outcome should be adopted from the dialogue, i.e. whether the outcome should be a substantive one with key messages or only a procedural one, and the duration of the dialogue.

UAE DIALOGUE

In the first informal consultations on this item co-facilitators **Ricardo Marshall (Barbados)** and **Patrick Spicer (Canada)**, requested Parties to share their views on three issues: scope, structure and follow up of the dialogue. Over the two informal consultations that have been held on this item so far, Parties shared their views on these three issues. Parties also addressed the important procedural question of the text that should be used for discussions on this item. It was clear from the discussions over two days that the wide divergences among Parties persisted on the question of scope, purpose and objective of the UAE dialogue. [They remained similar to the views they had shared earlier at SB62. See [TWN update](#) for details.] At the end of the second informal consultation, co facilitators announced they will present a new text based on the informal note that Parties had agreed to transmit from SB62 to CMA7.

[The [informal note](#) from SB62 was fully bracketed and contained two versions, with the first one reflecting the text that Parties had discussed during SB62 and previously in Baku, at CMA6, while the second version contained some additional elements that had been introduced into the text at the last moment by the **European Union (EU)** on the concluding day of SB62 in Bonn.]

[The mandate to “establish the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes” was provided in para 97 of the GST decision. This paragraph was under the ‘Finance’ heading of the ‘Means of implementation and support’ section. Para 98 of the decision decided that the UAE dialogue will be operationalised starting from CMA 6 (2024) and conclude in 2028, and requested the SBI 60 to “develop modalities for the dialogue” for consideration by CMA 6.]

Developing countries like the **Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, **Arab Group**, **India**, **China**, and **Philippines** expressed the need for respecting the mandate of the UAE dialogue which stemmed from the finance section of the outcome of the first GST [GST 1]. They stressed the need for focusing on utilising the dialogue as a space for having an exchange of views and information on issues related to finance required for addressing developing countries’ needs for climate action. They also highlighted that the UAE dialogue should conclude in 2026, to ensure no overlap in its work with the second GST [GST 2] process. They expressed a preference for relying on the first version contained in the informal note from SB62 for further discussions here at Belém on this item.

Saudi Arabia for the **LMDC** did not accept using UAE dialogue as a bridge between the GST 1 and GST 2 processes, as suggested by the **EU** and the **United Kingdom [UK]** as that would “make the UAE dialogue a mini-GST.” It described this suggestion as “using different language to come up with the same idea.”

Responding to references made by **Switzerland** for **Environment Integrity Group [EIG]** and **Australia** about addressing goals on energy transition in the GST 1 outcome, the LMDC said that was “completely prescriptive” and a top-down imposition of GST outcomes on Parties. It added

that this kind of cherry picking introduces new approaches to the implementation of the Paris Agreement [PA] and goes beyond the informal note that Parties had agreed upon at SB62.

India pointed out that the UAE dialogue cannot “get past the architecture of the PA” and called any attempts to make the dialogue a link between the first and second GST process as a way of introducing top-down elements in the PA, which was against its architecture.

China said the mandate of the UAE dialogue was to conduct a dialogue and not a review. Responding to the interventions made by developed countries about the idea of using the dialogue as a follow up mechanism for implementing the GST outcomes, it said, that if the UAE dialogue did that, it would become a mini-GST, adding further that what developed countries were asking for was to make the UAE dialogue’s modalities such that it would involve three phases: collecting inputs, producing reports, and considering those reports to produce a decision. It said inputs for the dialogue would be Parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs), national adaptation plans (NAPs), and National Communications (NCs) which was “essentially the same as the GST.” This similarity shows that the UAE dialogue would become a “replica of the GST” it stressed further. With the GST process starting next year, it said if both the GST and the UAE dialogue would be soliciting inputs next year, it pointed out that the only difference between the UAE dialogue and GST would then be that the dialogue would be conducted annually, while GST process is held every five years. It asked which would be a more meaningful process – one that is conducted over a year or one that is spread over five years. It said replicating a mini GST through the UAE dialogue would amount to re-writing of the PA and stressed that the UAE dialogue should be a “non-negotiated forum for discussing the implementation of real world problems...to identify opportunities and share ways for overcoming barriers for that.”

Developed countries like the **EU**, **EIG**, **UK**, **Australia**, **New Zealand**, and **Japan** said the UAE dialogue should focus on implementing all GST outcomes. They stressed that synthesis reports of the information discussed in the dialogue and messages from the dialogues should be considered

for a decision to be adopted by the CMA.

The **EU** and **UK** said the dialogue should be used as a bridge to link the first and second GST processes to ensure the full implementation of GST outcomes. The **EIG** said the dialogue should be a space to discuss all homeless elements of the GST 1 outcome and track progress of global goals contained in that outcome, especially those relating to fossil fuel transition and deforestation. **Australia** said if the dialogue conducts any discussion on trade, it must address issues relating to paragraphs 28 [on fossil fuel transition] and 33 [deforestation] of the GST 1 outcome. It also said that the annual decisions from the UAE dialogue should feed into the GST 2 process. **Japan** said the dialogue's focus should not be restricted to just the finance elements of the GST outcome but rather it should focus on all elements of the GST outcome.

Developing country groups like the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, **Independent Alliance of Latin American States (AILAC)**, and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** said the UAE dialogue should focus on the implementation of all GST outcomes with a particular focus on means of implementation, especially finance, technology and capacity building. They stressed the need for having a follow up of the UAE dialogue in the form of a decision.

The next informal consultation on this item is scheduled for Nov 13.

REFINEMENT OF THE OVERALL GST PROCESS

Presided over by co-facilitators **Eduardo Silva Besa (Chile)** and **Kelsey Gray (Australia)**, discussions on the 'procedural and logistical elements of the GST process' are being conducted on the basis of the [draft text](#) that Parties had prepared at SB62. The two informal consultations held on this matter have revealed that the main area of divergence amongst Parties hinges on the question of aligning cycle of the IPCC products for the AR 7 with that of the GST 2, to ensure that IPCC reports are made available in time for them to be considered at GST 2.

[The GST 2 concludes in 2028, with the process for inputs commencing in 2026 and the technical assessment phase taking place from 2027 to 2028.

Para 192 of GST 1 decision decided that "consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake" shall commence at SB 60 and conclude at CMA 6. However, at CMA 6 Parties adopted a procedural decision for continuing consideration of the matter at SB 62. For more details on background relating to these discussions at SB62 see [TWN update](#)].

Developing countries like the **LMDC**, **Arab Group**, **India**, and **China** have stressed the need for ensuring the integrity and independence of the IPCC which requires that Parties do not direct any changes to its timeline to align the IPCC's work with GST 2.

Saudi Arabia for the **LMDC** said "a typical IPCC timeline is 7 years, or even up to 9 years. Restricting that to 5 years [to align with GST cycle] can compromise the work of IPCC." It pointed out that developing countries do not have the resources to mobilise research within such a short period of time. Adding further, it said, "it is not our place to decide on whether there should be any alignment between the two cycles" and asked whether Parties are discussing "refinement for the GST process or refinement of the IPCC process."

China said that the integrity of the GST relies on the independent nature of scientific work and that the independence of the GST and IPCC should be maintained. It pointed out that the two have to be complementary processes. It said the GST is a Party driven process while IPCC is a science driven body and added that scientific inputs from IPCC to GST should occur without directing the IPCC's timeline. It said "accelerating the scientific process would affect and compromise the quality and public trust in scientific findings, especially in the current context where climate science faces questions in some places." It pointed out that meaningful participation in scientific research "requires sufficient time and resources."

India said it was puzzled by the continued discussion of the IPCC's relevance for GST 2, a matter that had been made clear in decision 19/CMA.1. Responding to interventions made by developed countries and some developing country groups about IPCC being "the best available

science” it said, the “IPCC reports are an assessment. They are a secondary source of scientific information, and not a primary source of scientific information.”

Developed countries like the **EU, EIG,** and **UK** expressed a preference for aligning the cycle of IPCC’s AR7 to that of GST 2. Calling the IPCC “the best available science,” they said aligning IPCC’s cycle to GST 2 would ensure that GST 2 fulfills its mandate.

Developing country groupings like **AOSIS, AILAC,** and **LDCs** too emphasised on aligning the IPCC’s

work on its AR7 with the GST 2 process and stressed that the IPCC is the main and only source of best available science.

[The issue of aligning IPCC’s AR7 cycle with GST 2 was also a key area of divergence at the sixty third meeting of IPCC held in Lima, Peru ahead of COP30. See [TWN update](#) for details.]

The next informal consultation on this item is schedule on Nov 14.